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Making Best Interests Significant for Children Who Offend: A Scottish Perspective 
CLAIRE MCDIARMID 
 
A. Introduction 
Overall, one of the outstanding qualities of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 ? ‘Z ? ?1  is its universality.  It is the most ratified2 treaty in the world.3  Through rights, then, it offers 
ƵŶŝĨŽƌŵƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĂůŵŽƐƚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ  ? ? ?4 As part of 
ƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ƌƵďƌŝĐŚŽůĚƐŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ
being taken by public bodies, courts and tribunals.  Universalism, however, does not elide all 
concerns about access to, ability to exercise, and exclusion from, the rights apparently conferred.  
While all children have CRC rights, practical issues like poverty5 or the scarcity, as a fact, of national 
resources may prevent their exercise and the status of the CRC as not directly incorporated into 
domestic law in many jurisdictions militates against the provision of mechanisms for addressing 
violations.6  Alongside these practical issues, other perceived barriers also arise such as the risk of 
essentialism  W ƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ?ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŵĂǇ ďĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚĂƐĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ
an image of ƚŚĞǁĞƐƚĞƌŶŽƌŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?7  Similarly, the 
perception of the child-offender sometimes engenders a view of lesser entitlement to the protection 
offered by rights.  In the context of the Scottish legal system, tŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌĂĚŽƉƚƐĂ ůŝƚĞƌĂů ?  ‘ďĂĐŬ-to 
                                                          
1 UN, General Assembly, 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3. 
2 ZĂĚŚŝŬĂŽŽŵĂƌĂƐǁĂŵǇ ? ‘tŽŵĞŶĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ PƚŚĞĐƵƚƚŝŶŐĞĚŐ ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?American 
University International Law Review 1- 40 at 7. 
3 Only the USA has not ratified it.  Somalia did so on 1st October 2015.  
4 CRC, Art. 1. 
5 ^ĞĞtŽƵƚĞƌsĂŶĚĞŶŚŽůĞ ? ‘ŚŝůĚƉŽǀĞƌƚǇĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ PĂŶƵŶĞĂƐǇĨŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Michigan State 
International Law Review 609  W 636. 
6 The Third Optional Protocol to the CRC on a Communications Procedure, New York, 19 December 2011, in 
force 14 April 2014 creates a mechanism for reporting violations to the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child however this has not been ratified by the UK. 
7 See, for example, Jane Fortin, ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚs and the Developing Law (3rd ed) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?EŝĐŽůĂŶƐĞůů ? ‘dŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞZŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝůĚ PĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
ĨŽƌĨƌŝĐĂŶĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ŝŶĨƵĂdǁƵŵ-Danso Imoh and Nicola Ansell (eds.) ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ>ŝǀĞƐŝŶĂŶƌĂŽĨŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
Rights: The Progress of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Africa (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 235. 
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ďĂƐŝĐƐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚďŽƚŚ ŝƚƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ? ŝƚƐ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĨŽƌĂůůĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĐŽŵŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƌĞĂĐŚ ?dŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ
takes the position of children who offend as its focal point considering particularly how the Article 
ƐŚŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƐĞƐ ?/ƚƐŬĞǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĨŽƌĂůů
children including, equally, for those who do wrong, a position which is fully supported by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.8 
The paper will firstly consider the negative perception of children who offend in relation to their 
rights.  It will then turn to the terms of Article 3 itself and examine the ways in which it is 
incorporated into Scots law as it applies to offenders, and its application.  Finally it will look at recent 
research reports compiled by the Centre for Youth and Criminal Justice and by the Scottish 
ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐZĞƉŽƌƚĞƌĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĞĚƐŽŵĞůŝŐŚƚŽŶǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ŽǁŶǀŝĞǁƐŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-
making allegedly in their best interests.  Overall, it concludes that the terms of Article 3 provide the 
framework to offer and achieve much more in terms of outcome than is currently the case. 
 
B. The Rights of Children who Offend 
Children who commit crime are still children and, as such, are bearers of the rights conferred by the 
CRC.9  In fact, the Convention specifically recognises them as in need of greater protection in certain 
respects by its inclusion of Article 37 which tempers the application of criminal sanctions to the 
young and in Article 40 which makes provision for their right to a fair trial.  Nonetheless, there is a 
particular rhetoric, stronger at historical moments when youth crime is a highly politicised issue,10 
that child-offenders, through their (deemed) choice to commit wrongful acts, render themselves less 
                                                          
8 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 14 on the Right of the Child to 
have his or her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (Art. 3, para. 1) (2013) (CRC/C/GC/14).  
Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf. 
9 Ibid, para. 28. 
10 For example, in England and Wales between 1997 and 2010 under New Labour, as exemplified by the White 
Paper, No More Excuses (London: TSO, 1997). 
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entitled to other, so-called, protection rights.11  Indeed, at the extreme, some might argue that these 
are forfeited.12  Raymond Arthur has explained the issue in this way, in relation to English criminal 
procedure: 
The English youth justice system ... developed in a way which weakens and 
negates the protection rights stemming from the UN Convention by perpetuating 
the idea that if children are competent they are automatically assumed capable of 
negotiating their way through a liberal universe of choices, and the offender is no 
longer a child and no longer worthy of special protection of their rights.13 
 
The issue arises partly because children who offend present a paradox14 which law is not always 
equipped to resolve effectively.  On the one hand, children, as a group, are regarded as vulnerable 
ĂŶĚŝŶŶĞĞĚŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ‘ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐe 
ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚĂŶĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽĚŽǁƌŽŶŐ ? ‘ŚŝůĚ-ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ďĞůŽŶŐƚŽďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
groups at once but the law is more used to dealing with each as a separate category.  Child and 
family law is applied to the vulnerable; criminal law applies ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ?  ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
conceived as a discrete area of law, has been relatively more successful in adopting the holistic 
approach which is needed, in that Articles 37 and 40 specifically give cognisance to some of the 
unique vulnerabilities of the child-offender and Article 12 is widely recognised as at least a basic 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵĨŽƌŐŝǀŝŶŐĐƌĞĚĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞ
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĂƚǁĞŝŐŚƚŝƐƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞǀŝĞǁƐ ‘ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚe age and maturity of 
ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ? ?15  Nonetheless, in the context of the law as a whole, the rights of children who do wrong 
                                                          
11 Protection rights include, for example, rights to health (Art. 24), to benefit from social security (Art. 26) and 
to an adequate standard of living (Art. 27). 
12 See Fortin, ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ>Ăǁ, (above, note 7,) p. 683. 
13 Raymond Arthuƌ ? ‘ZĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞǇŽƵƚŚũƵƐƚŝĐĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 21  W 37 at 27 (reference omitted). 
14 See Claire McDiarmid, Childhood and Crime (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2007), pp. 165  W 167. 
15 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŝĨĞEŽůĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞĐŚŝůĚĂƐ ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝƚŝǌĞŶ ? P- ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŐĂƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Public Law 767  W 782, particularly 780, though the author criticises the tendency to subjugate autonomy to 
protection. 
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are not prominent and, in Scotland, there has been only very limited recourse to Articles 37 and 
40.16 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌŬĞǇ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ŵĂǇ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ďĞ ?Žƌ ďĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ? ŝŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
opposition to the interests of a child who commits a crime.  For example, the CRC accords to a child 
 ‘ŝŶ ƚƌŽƵďůĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ Ăƚ ĂŶǇ ƐƚĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? Ă ƌŝŐŚƚ  ‘ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ŚŝƐ Žƌ ŚĞƌ Ɖƌŝǀacy fully 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?17  In a recent English case, a 15-year old who murdered his teacher in a pre-meditated 
knife attack was named by the media following a specific order by the judge, who justified this by 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚĐŽŵĞĚŽǁŶ ‘ĨŝƌŵůǇŽŶƚŚĞƐŝĚĞ ŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?18  It cannot therefore be 
ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?dŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
one that they should not be.  Even where there must be some form of balancing of competing rights 
 W for eǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ19 cannot be upheld where 
s/he has been sentenced to a period of detention by a criminal court20 - there is no justification for 
the Article 3 protection ceasing to apply.  Its content, and its application in the Scottish context, will 
now be considered. 
 
C. The Promise of the Best Interests Standard in Article 3 
Article 3 sets the bar high in terms of expectation of outcome arising from its application.  Art 3(1) 
states: 
 
                                                          
16 See footnotes 45  W 49 below and accompanying text. 
17 Art. 40(2)(vii). 
18 ƌŽŽŬĞ ? ‘:ƵĚŐĞ PǁŚǇ/ǁĂƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŶĂŵĞƚŚĞƚĞĂĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƚĞĞŶŬŝůůĞƌ ? ?Daily Mail, 6 Nov 2014.  See also Ursula 
^ŵĂƌƚƚ ? ‘ ?tŚǇ/ǁĂƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŶĂŵĞƚŚĞƚĞĂĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƚĞĞŶŬŝůůĞƌ ? PŶĂŵŝŶŐƚĞĞŶĂŐĞƌƐŝŶĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƚƌŝĂls and law reform 
ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Communications Law 5 - 14 at 6. 
19 Art. 9(1). 
20 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ss. 44 and 208. 
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In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
 
This is not qualified.  It includes  ‘all ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ĂŶĚinter alia, those undertaken by 
public social welfare institutions, courts of law and administrative authorities.  The principle clearly 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŽŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞ ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶǁŚŽŽĨĨĞŶĚ ?In terms of what 
it means, if an element is a  ‘primary ? consideration in reaching any decision both common sense and 
basic legal interpretative skills would indicate that it must be an important one in that decision-
making process.  Even if Article 3 stated only that it had to be a ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ?ƵŶƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?  ‘ďĞƐƚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵŝǆ ? ‘WƌŝŵĂƌǇ ? ?ŝĨŝƚŝƐ ŶŽƚũƵƐƚĂǁĞĂƐĞůǁŽƌĚ ?ŝŶƐĞƌƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
meaning, makes best interests significant ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ‘best ?ŵĞĂŶƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?
/Ĩ ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ĂƌĞ ‘ĂƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? W and Article 3 says that they shall be, not that they 
may be21 - a child about to enter a decision-making process armed with this information could 
reasonably expect that something really good for him/her is likely to come out of it.  In other words: 
 
dŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ “ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŵĂǇ
not be considered on the same level as all other conƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?sŝĞǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚĂƐ “ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞ
ƚŚĂƚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŵƵƐƚ ŽĐĐƵƉǇ ŝŶ Ăůů ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ Ă ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ
priority to those interests in all circumstances, but especially when an action has 
an undeniable impact on the children concerned.22 
 
How, then, is this translated into Scots law, particularly in relation to child-offenders? 
 
D. Scots Law and Children Who Offend 
                                                          
21 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 14 (Art. 3(1)), (2013) (above note 8), 
para. 36. 
22 Ibid, at paras. 37 and 40 (emphasis added). 
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It is first of all necessary to explain the mechanisms by which Scots law deals with children who 
ŽĨĨĞŶĚ ?dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƌŽƵƚĞŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐĨŽƌƌĞĨĞƌƌĂů
ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the child has committed an offence ? ?23  Children aged eight and over may be so 
referred.24  It is also ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĂŐĞĚ  ? ? ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŽ ďĞ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ ďƵƚŽŶůǇ  ‘on the 
ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ? ?ŽƌĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ? ? ?ƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?25 and usually for grave offences.26  The 
vast majority of child-ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?27 which deals with 
such cases in the same way as those of children referred on each of its other 15 (care and 
protection) grounds.28  Decisions are taken by a panel of three lay members, trained for the function 
and, importantly, the determinative principle is ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?  /ƚ ŝƐŚĞƌĞ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ƚŚĂƚƌƚŝĐůĞ  ?
finds its first direct expression in Scots law. 
 
E. Article 3 in Scots Law 
(a) Best Interests and Welfare 
                                                          
23 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ũ ? ?
24 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 41. 
25 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 42(1). 
26 See the Lord Advocate's Guidelines to the Chief Constable on the Reporting to Procurators Fiscal of offences 
alleged to have been committed by children (2014) available at: 
http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Lord_Advocates_Guideline
s/Lord%20Advocates%20Guidelines%20offences%20committed%20by%20children.pdf. 
27 ^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐĨŽƌƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨŽƌƌĞĨĞƌƌĂůƚŽĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐŽŶƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĐĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĂƌĞĐŽŵƉŝůĞĚ
separately and do not readily dovetail.  In 2013/14, the official government statistics record that the number 
of children aged under 16 with a charge proved against them in court per 1000 population was zero.  8 per 
thousand 16-year olds and 25 per thousand 17-year olds were counted.  The Report notĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘/ŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ? ?
ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǇŽƵŶŐĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂƐĨĂůůĞŶĂƚŵƵĐŚĨĂƐƚĞƌƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂŶĨŽƌŽůĚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?
(Scottish Government, Statistical Bulletin Crime and Justice Series: Criminal Proceedings in Scotland 2013/14, 
para. 3.5.1 and Table 5 (available at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/00469252.pdf).  By contrast, 2764 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶǁĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĨŽƌŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ W a decrease of 20.4% on the 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ P^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐZĞƉŽƌƚĞƌĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Annual Report 2013/14, p. 22 (available at 
http://www.scra.gov.uk/cms_resources/Annual%20Report%202013-14%20web%20version.pdf). The Scottish 
Law Commission estimated that 99% of children aged under 16 alleged to have committed an offence were 
ĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ PReport on Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 185) 
(Edinburgh: TSO, 2002) at para. 3.10. 
28 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? 
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Unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, the CRC as a whole is not incorporated into Scots 
law and, therefore, does not have direct effect.  Despite this, the provisions of Article 3 are directly 
legislated but (like English law)29 ƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ? 
 ‘tĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ŚĂƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƵƐĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞũŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŝĨƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƚĂďůŽŝĚ ?ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ
ƐĐƌŽƵŶŐĞƌ ? ?30  In Scottish child law, however, it has a long and well-respected history and denotes the 
principle that identifying and meeting hitherto unmet needs on the part of children will have a 
generally beneficial effect on their lives and will, specifically, operate to reduce to a vanishing point 
their offending behaviour.  This argument is given passionate expression - quite specifically in 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ  ‘ũƵǀĞŶŝůĞ ĚĞůŝŶƋƵĞŶĐǇ ?- in the Kilbrandon Report of 1964 on the basis of which the 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐƐĞƚƵƉ ?/ƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ P 
The object must be to effect, so far as this can be achieved by public action, the 
reduction, and ideally the elimination, of delinquency.  If public concern must 
always be for the effective treatment of delinquency, the appropriate treatment 
measures in any individual case can be decided only on an informed assessment 
of the individual child's actual needs.31 
 
There may be (though, in fact, this is rare) some debate as to the relationship between the Scottish 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞZ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? 32 but, here, they are used 
interchangeably.33 
 
(b) Scottish  ‘Article 3 ? Legislative Provisions 
(i) the Paramountcy Principle 
                                                          
29 Children Act 1989, s. 1(1). 
30 ^ĞĞ ?ĞŐ ‘dŚĞǁĞůĨŝĞƐ PƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐĐƌŽƵŶŐĞƌƐĂŶĚĚŽƐƐĞƌƐ ?The Sun 15 January 15 2015, p. 2. 
31 Scottish Home and Health Department, Scottish Education Department Report on Children and Young 
People, Scotland (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1964) Cmnd. 2306, p. 8, para. 12. 
32 For an in-ĚĞƉƚŚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĞĞ:ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶ,ĞƌƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŚĂƌůĞƐ&ŽƐƚĞƌ ? ‘tĞůĨĂƌĞŵĞĂŶƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ǀŝƌƚƵĞ
aŶĚĂůƚƌƵŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Legal Studies 480  W 498, pp. 482  W 483. 
33 In fact, there is little clear distinction drawn in the case law.  See, for example, M v. K 2015 CSIH 54. 
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For most decisions concerning children, the domestic Scottish legislation augments the Article 3 
primacy requirement.  The relevant provision (which does not cover the small number of children 
who are prosecuted) states: 
 
[W]here ... a children's hearing, pre-hearing panel or court is coming to a decision 
about a matter relating to a child [, ...it] is to regard the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of the child throughout the child's childhood as the 
paramount consideration.34 
 
It would be hard to gŝǀĞĂ ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ
applied to those who offend in the same way as to those referred on any other ground.35 
 
(ii) Welfare as a Primary Consideration 
In the immediately following section of the relevant Act, however, the paramountcy requirement is 
qualified so that the listed decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐďŽĚŝĞƐ  ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?ƉƌĞ-hearing panels, courts) 
ŵĂǇĚĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŝƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĚĞĞŵƚŚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ‘for the purpose of protecting members of the 
public from serious ŚĂƌŵ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŽƌŶŽƚ ? ?ďƵƚ ?ŝŶƚŚŽƐĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞ
ŵƵƐƚ Ɛƚŝůů ďĞ  ‘Ă ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?36  This provision 
makes no specific reference to child-offenders yet it is hard to think of circumstances where a child is 
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĐĂƵƐĞƐƵĐŚ ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŚĂƌŵ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůůĂǁ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĚĞƉĂƌƚ
from paramountcy first appeared, in a different form, in the Children (Scotland) Act of 199537 and an 
examination of the Parliamentary debate relating to it illustrates the point.  Lord Macaulay of Bragar 
said: 
                                                          
34 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?
35 See Merrin v. S 1987 SLT 193. 
36 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?
37 S. 16(5). 
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With this amendment we are seeking to deal with "a little monster" in society, a 
person who slashes car tyres, who breaks car windows and who is out of control. 
What is the paramount consideration? I do not know where the word 
"paramount" comes from. I think it is an Americanism, but it is a horrible word. It 
does not mean anything, but anyway it is in the Bill. Where does paramountcy go 
in achieving the balance between society and the individual?38 
 
The shift away from paramountcy, then, seems to have been conceived as an intentional, 
government-sanctioned, dilution of the rights of children who offend with no clear statement of the 
way in which their welfare was to be considered instead.39  In the current (2011) version of the 
provision, this public (safety) interest is only to be balanced in alongside best interests, which remain 
primary.  It does not trump them.  TŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞƚĂŬĞŶĂƐĂǁĞůĐŽŵĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ
matter though, clearly, there is still some diminution between best interests as paramount and as a 
primary consideration. 
But are these apparently different standards of best interests meaningful?  What is the difference in 
practice between paramountcy and primacy in this context?  There appears to be no reported case 
in which this power to depart from the paramountcy principle has been considered.  This makes it 
difficult to know how to determine the difference in law ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ? ĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?  /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ŵĂŶƵĂů ĨŽƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƉĂŶĞů ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐƐĂĨĞƚǇƌƵůĞ P ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚŝƐŝƐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƉĂŶĞůŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁŝůůǀĞƌǇƌĂƌĞůǇƵƐĞ ? ?40  While, clearly, 
                                                          
38 Official Report of the Grand Committee on the Children Scotland Bill, Hansard, HL Deb 06 June 1995 vol 564 
cc1-66GC, at § 37GC (available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/grand_committee_report/1995/jun/06/official-report-of-the-committee-
on-the#S5LV0564P0_19950606_GCR_260). 
39 The original, 1995 version of s. 16(5)(a) stated: 
 ‘If, for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm (whether or not physical harm) ?   
 ?Ă ?ĂĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽŵĂŬĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌŽƌďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚŝƐWĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĐƚǁŚŝĐŚ
(but for this paragraph) would not be consistent with their affording paramountcy to the consideration 
mentioned in subsection (1) above, they may make that decision ? ? 
40 ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Practice and Procedure Manual  ?ĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚ PŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?
2013) p. 16, para. 3.4. 
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the existence of the provision demonstrates that it is permissible to give less prominence to the 
welfare of children who are deemed a risk to public safety than to that of others, there is little to 
indicate that this is actually being done in ƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
 
(iii) Welfare of Prosecuted Children 
The final Scottish provision meriting consideration in the Article 3 context relates specifically to 
children who are prosecuted.  It also considerably pre-dates both the Z ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
hearings system41 yet it still occupies the territory of welfare-based approaches.  It states:  
Every court in dealing with a child who is brought before it as an offender shall 
have regard to the welfare of the child and shall in a proper case take steps for 
removing him from undesirable surroundings.42 
dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ?/ƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƵƐĞ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ?ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇůŝŬĞ ‘ƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ?Žƌ ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐ
unambiguous in its attachment to children who offend.  It imposes a duty on all courts to consider 
their welfare.  It is a provision for the tiny number of Scottish children who are prosecuted in the 
adult courts and it cannot be balanced against, or diluted by virtue of, offending behaviour because 
its only application is where such acts are alleged.  As such, it seems valuable.  It does, however, 
have some limitations. 
First, it is unclear what would happen if a court failed to apply it.  Second, the meaning to be 
ĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽ  ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? ŝƐŶŽƚƐƉĞůƚŽƵƚ ? ŽĞƐ ŝƚŵĞĂŶ ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?Žƌ  ‘ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƵŶŵĞƚ
ŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚŵĞƚ ?ŽƌĚŽĞƐŝƚƌĞůĂƚĞŽŶůǇƚŽƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the criminal proceedings in question  W Ă ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ǁĞůů-ďĞŝŶŐ ? ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ?  dŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŐŽĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ  Wsomething beyond the scope of the instant 
                                                          
41 It appeared in the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (s. 49) and was repeated in the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 as s. 172. 
42 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 50(6). 
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proceedings - suggests the former.  Again, a dearth of case law makes it difficult to put the matter 
beyond doubt. 
 
F. The Temporal Dimension and Paternalism 
This inquiry also brings into focus the temporal dimension of Article 3 and its domestic Scottish 
derivatives.  In other wŽƌĚƐ ? ĨŽƌ ŚŽǁ ůŽŶŐ ŵƵƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ǁĞŝŐŚ ŝŶƚŚĞ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
decision?  The Scottish paramountcy provision is unequivocal that decision-makers must take it into 
account  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ ?.  Article 3 and the Scottish public safety exception both 
make best interests primary, thereby giving it at least some longevity beyond the moment of making 
the decision, since it will continue to operate as the decision is implemented. 
On the face of it, this seemƐƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŝƚƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞĂůŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?EŽƚŽŶůǇŵƵƐƚĂ
decision-ŵĂŬĞƌŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛbest interests in mind at the moment of making the decision but 
also for (possibly) years to come.  In fact, however, as far as the child is concerned, this need to look 
to the future may operate to allow a particularly adultist or paternalist approach to come to the 
ĨŽƌĞ ?  dŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ǁŝƐŚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌ ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǁŝƐŚĞƐ  ?Žƌ  ‘ǀŝĞǁƐ ? ?43 
should be taken into account in determining best interests.  Child-friendly statements of the 
principle of Article 3 make clear just how little weight needs to be conferred on these wishes 
however.  UNICEF states: 
All adults should do what is best for you. When adults make decisions, they 
should think about how their decisions will affect children. 
The Scottish Government states: 
If a decision is being made by any organisation about your well-being, then your 
interests must be considered when making the final decision. What is best for 
                                                          
43 ƌƚ ? ? ? ?ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? 
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YOU is what matters. For example, if a local authority is planning a new road they 
have to think about how their plans affect your safety.44 
The child who has read the original Article and is expecting a decision in which his/her best interests 
are, at least, a primary consideration will realise that it is an adult view of his/her good which is 
definitive.  Adults have also, by definition, proceeded to the end of the period of the lifespan called 
childhood.  There may be an argument that this equips them to know better how a decision will bear 
 ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚǁŚŽŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚƐƚŽĨ ŝƚ ?/ĨƚŚŝƐƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ
Ă ĐŚŝůĚ ĞǆƉĞĐƚŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌ ŽǁŶ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇ ŐŽŽĚ ? ƚŽ ĞŵĞƌŐĞ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ŝƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ
detract from the overarching principle that the outcome should still be  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ? ?dŽǁŚĂƚĞǆƚĞŶƚ
is this the case?  The paper will look firstly at prosecuted children and then at those who are 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
 
G. The Best Interests of Children who are Prosecuted 
Only a very small number of children (for this purpose, those aged 17 and under) are prosecuted in 
the adult courts.  At the outset of this process, a decision will have been taken jointly to refer such a 
child to the reporter to thĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƉĂŶĞůĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĐƵƌĂƚŽƌĨŝƐĐĂůƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌ
ĐĂƐĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŽƌďǇƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĞǁŽƌƚŚǇ
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?Ɛ'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?45 which govern this process, make no reference to the child-
ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŝƐĂƚůĞĂƐƚŶŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌŽǁŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐBook 
of Regulations.46  Nonetheless, the Scottish High Court has noted with approval resort being made to 
                                                          
44 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide for Children and Young People (Edinburgh: The 
Scottish Government, 2008) (emphasis in original). 
45 >ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?ƐŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐŽŶƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŽĨŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐĂůůĞŐĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚďǇĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ(2014) 
(above note 26). 
46 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Prosecution Policy and Guidance  ? Book of Regulations, Chapter 
16  W Children (1998), p. 1 available at: 
http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Book_of_Regulations/Book
%20of%20Regulations%20-%20Chapter%2016%20-%20Children.PDF.  Similar guidance provided by the Crown 
Prosecution Service in England and Wales on Youth Offenders (available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/youth_offenders/#a01) is more nuanced and, in places, makes reference 
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the CRC where the accused is a child.  In HM Advocate v. P,47 Lord Reed made reference to Article 40 
(right to a fair trial) and to the Beijing Rules,48 noting that the European Court of Human Rights had 
ƵƐĞĚĞĂĐŚ ‘as a source of guidance as to the requirements imposed by the European Convention in 
relation to proceedings involving juvenile offenders ? ?49  Little seems to have been said beyond this in 
any subsequent case  W ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂĐŚŝůĚ ŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŶŽƚĞĚŝŶĐĂƐĞ
reports suggesting that, once the decision to prosecute has been taken, it is not seen as particularly 
significant. 
In relation to the sentencing of juveniles though, it has been stated, in Hibbard v. HM Advocate,50 
that 
 
the court has no difficulty with the proposition that, when sentencing a child for 
any offence, the sentence selected ought to take into account, as a primary 
consideration, the welfare of the child and the desirability of his reintegration into 
society. It is not the only primary consideration, since the legislation requires that 
the seriousness of the offence be taken into account and that the period selected 
satisfies the requirements for retribution and deterrence. But it is one. In this way, 
the sentencing of a child will differ in the degree of emphasis or weight placed on 
the welfare of the person sentenced. With an adult, it is also a consideration, but 
it may not always be categorised as a primary one, at least where murder is 
concerned.51 
 
Subsequent cases have also articulated the principle but the emphasis on welfare as only one among 
a number of important considerations means that the outcome is not always necessarily in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the types of information which should be obtained in deciding wheƚŚĞƌƚŽƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞ ?ĞŐ ‘views of local 
authority Children's and Young People's Service ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĂƉĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
ƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚŝƐĂůƐŽĂĐŚŝůĚ ? ? ?^ĞĞ>ĂƵƌĂ,ŽǇĂŶŽ ? ‘Decision to prosecute: whether decision of defendant to 
prosecute a child for alleged sexual abuse by her of her two younger sisters amenable to judicial review ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Criminal Law Review 39  W 46. 
47 2001 SLT 924. 
48 The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, Beijing, 29 November 1985. 
49 HM Advocate v. P 2001 SLT 924, at p. 927 para. 11. 
50 2011 JC 149. 
51 Ibid, at pp. 153  W 154 per Lord Carloway. 
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ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?/ŶHM Advocate v KH52 for example, while ƚŚĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵƌƚ ‘had 
specific regard to the welfare of the respondent as a primary consideration ?53 ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ
(absolute discharge) was quashed as unduly lenient and a community payback order was imposed 
instead. He was aged 15 at the time of the offence and had pled guilty to a sexual assault against a 
classmate.  A competing interest  W the need for a punitive element  W was considered definitive.  It 
might be questioned how  ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ-ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞin a decision, 
taken by the state, to appeal a sentence in order to have it made more severe where the young 
person has already been through a court process, accepted his guilt and, to some extent, moved on. 
On the other hand, in HM Advocate v Smith,54 another Crown appeal against an unduly lenient 
sentence, the original sentence remained in place.  It had been reached after careful assessment of a 
ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ƚƌŽƵďůĞĚ ŚŽŵĞ ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?  tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ŽǀĞƌƚ
reference to welfare or best interests, it appears that considerations relevant to these issues were 
applied. 
The extent to which best interests looks to collapse into leniency is of some relevance.  The 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŝůĚ ŝƐ ƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂů ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘protecting the child's best 
interests means that the traditional objectives of criminal justice, such as repression or retribution, 
must give way to rehabilitation and restorative justice objectives, when dealing with child 
offenders. ?55 
 
H. ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ PzŽƵŶŐWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐsŝĞǁƐŽĨ ?Best Interests ? in Practice 
                                                          
52 2014 SCCR 485. 
53 Ibid, at p. 487, para. 11 per Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway. 
54 2014 SCCR 39. 
55 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 14 (Art. 3(1)), (2013) (above note 8), para. 
28. 
15 
 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂĐƚƵĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƚĂŬĞŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨǁŚŽŵƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶǁŝůůďĞ
considered, through examination of two, recent, small-scale, research projects.  The first, entitled 
Youth In Justice: Young People Explore What Their Role in Improving Youth Justice should be56 was 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ũŽŝŶƚůǇ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚƌĞ ĨŽƌ zŽƵƚŚ ĂŶĚ ƌŝŵŝŶĂů :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ  ? ‘z: ? ?57 and by Space Unlimited,58 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚǁĞƌĞĂůůĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ ?ŽƌĂƚƌŝƐŬŽĨďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ
ŝŶ ? ǇŽƵƚŚ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?59  Accordingly, they are well qualified to comment.  Overall, they were 
aged between 13 and 21 and participated as three separate groups.60  The other study was 
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ZĞƉŽƌƚĞƌ ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ? ‘^Z ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚThe 
ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ^ǇƐƚĞŵ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐĂŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ PzŽƵŶŐWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐsŝĞǁƐ.61  ^Z ?Ɛ
members  W ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ Ware ƚŚĞŐĂƚĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ
system.  The 21 young participants in the study were aged between 11 and 17 and had experience of 
the hearings system, some in relation to offending behaviour.62 
 
The two studies are partly conceƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ
process.  In principle, Article 3 relates to decisions and their consequences.  Article 12 which affords 
to the child who wishes to do so the right to express views and have these taken into account seems 
more directly relevant to process.  There is, however, a close link between views and decisions such 
that the Committee on the Rights of the Child has specifically stated that  ‘there can be no correct 
                                                          
56 (Glasgow: Space Unlimited, 2015). 
57 Which exists to support improvements in youth justice through practice, research and knowledge 
exchange.  See its own website at: http://www.cycj.org.uk/about-us/background/. 
58 ƐŽĐŝĂůĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĂŶĚĐŚĂƌŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶĚŝrect collaboration with 
ǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞƐŝŐŶĂŶĚƚĂŬĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?^ĞĞ^ƉĂĐĞhŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞĂƚ P
http://www.spaceunlimited.org/. 
59 Space Unlimited, Youth in Justice (2015) (above note 56), at p. 2. 
60 Ibid, at pp. 5 -6. 
61 (Stirling: SCRA, 2011) (available at: 
http://www.scra.gov.uk/cms_resources/Young%20peoples%20views%20on%20decisions%20services%20and
%20outcomes.pdf). 
62 Ibid, at p. 7 and p. 21. 
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application of article 3 if the components of article 12 are not respected. ?63  There is also an 
argument that the fairness of any such process has a direct impact on perceptions of the justice or 
acceptability of the final decision64 and will, therefore, have an impact on the individual young 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨ ŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌďĞƐƚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ  ? WƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽƌǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚďĞƐƚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ? ƚŚƵƐ ? ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ůŝŶŬĞĚ ?  tŝƚŚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶ ŵŝŶĚ ? ǁŚĂƚ ĚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ƐĂǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
hearings?  The view of CYCJ participants ǁĂƐ  ‘mostly negative.   They described feeling judged, 
ignored, not listened to, sometimes barely even addressed when in the room, and talked about 
being excluded from the process and not understanding it. ?65  While this may tell us little about 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?perception of the decision was that it had not been good. 
 
The SCRA study asked a question which was more directly relevant to Article 3:  ‘ ?Ě ?ŽĞƐƚŚĞŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
Hearings System make a difference to the lives of children and young people? ?66 but still took the 
process into account.  Some young people felt, specifically, that their views had not been heard in 
the process and  ‘[a]ll the young people had experienced a Hearing that made a decision that was 
against their wishes. However, there still appeared to be widespread acceptance that it was a fair 
process. ?67  dŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?/ƚĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ P 
 
[m]ost of the young people in this research felt their lives had got better since being 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ?  ? ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĞƚƵƐ ĨŽƌ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ  W for 
ǇŽƵŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?  ? KǀĞƌĂůů ? ǇŽƵŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ
commitment to change that had improved their lives.68 
 
                                                          
63 United Nation Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12: The Right of the Child to be 
Heard (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, (available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/CRC-C-GC-12.pdf) at para. 74. 
64 Victoria Weisz, Twila Wingrove and April Faith-^ůĂŬĞƌ ? ‘ŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂŶĚWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Court 
Review 36  W 43. 
65 Space Unlimited, Youth in Justice (2015) (above note 56), p. 8. 
66 dŚĞŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ^ǇƐƚĞŵ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐĂŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ PzŽƵŶŐWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐsŝĞǁƐ(2011)(above, 
note 61) at p. 6. 
67 Ibid, p. 12 (emphasis added). 
68 Ibid, p. 27. 
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On the one hand then, these young people do not ƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ
ǁĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ W that as a direct consequence of it, their lives improved.  On the other, 
there is a sense that they themselves converted a, probably paternalistic, decision about what would 
be best for them, into a catalyst for positive change.  They reclaimed their agency to achieve the 
ŐŽŽĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?dŚƵƐ ?ŝĨƚŚĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ? ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ?ĞƋƵĂůůǇ ?ŶŽƚǁŚŽůůǇďĂĚ ?
 ‘tĞůĨĂƌĞĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ ?ďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘ĂŶŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚůŝĨĞ ? ?
 
I. Conclusion 
KǀĞƌĂůůƚŚĞŶ ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐĐůĞĂƌƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ?ŚŽůĚƐŽƵƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨ  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ
for all children in respect of whom official decisions are taken including, on the same terms, those 
ǁŚŽŽĨĨĞŶĚ ? tŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ŝƐƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ?  /Ŷ
other words, it could not have greater significance yet the young people about whom its decisions 
ĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶĚŽŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƚƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚ ? ?&ŽƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶǁŚŽĂƌĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ ?
the status of best interests as a primary consideration may allow other primary considerations to be 
balanced in alongside, rather than the overarching concentration on welfare, rehabilitation and 
ƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞhEĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƚĂŬĞŶĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ
3 states that best interests shall be primary.  Decision-makers, and particularly those deciding about 
children who offend who may have fewer advocates, must welcome the opportunity this provides to 
ensure those really good outcomes. 
 
